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Abstract
The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In
Manski’s (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account endogenous interactions, i.e.,
social conformity effects, exogenous interactions, i.e., fairness effects, and correlated effects.
Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must decide how much income to
report given individual and group tax rates and audit probabilities, and given a feedback on the
other members’ reporting behavior. Myopic and self-consistent expectations are considered in
the analysis. In the latter case, the estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with
ﬁxed group effects. A unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisﬁes coherency
conditions. In line with Brock and Durlauf (2001b), the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual
and group responses helps identify the model. Our results provide evidence of fairness effects but
reject social conformity.
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In the standard model of tax evasion ﬁrst proposed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and
Yitzhaki (1974), the taxpayer is treated as an isolated expected utility maximizer who makes
a portfolio decision under uncertainty. Cheating on taxes boils down to a risky activity whose
payoff is either a lower tax burden or a penalty imposed by the tax authority. This theoretical
frameworkassumesthatthetaxpayeriscompletelyindividualisticandamoral. Hiswillingness
to underreport income is not affected by social norms nor by any form of social interactions.
Consequently, predicting the effects of tax or fraud prevention policies can be seriously mis-
lead if social interactions do indeed play a signiﬁcant role in tax evasion behavior. Thus, as is
well known since Schelling (1978) and Akerlof (1980), interdependent behavior may generate
multiple equilibria and exhibit contagion and epidemic features through a “social multiplier
effect” [see Glaeser et al. (2003) for a recent discussion].
There are many reasons to believe that individual tax evasion decisions are affected by
social norms and social interactions (e.g., Andreoni et al. 1998). First, Erard and Feinstein
(1994) insist on the role of guilt and shame in tax compliance behavior. Alm, McClelland
and Schulze (1999) show that social norms play a crucial role and that voting on ﬁscal rules
or communication can affect these norms. Likewise, Gordon (1989) and Myles and Naylor
(1996) argue that an individual can derive a psychic payoff from adhering to the standard
patternofreportingbehaviorin hisreference group(socialconformityeffect). Second, through
learning from his peers, a taxpayer may ﬁnd less costly ways to underreport income, to lower
the risk of being caught or to reduce penalties associated with tax audits (social learning
effect). Finally, the individual’s perception of the fairness of his tax burden may inﬂuence
his tax evasion decisions. Indeed, Spicer and Becker (1980) have provided evidence that those
who believethey are treated unfairly by the tax system are more likely to evadetaxes to restore
equity (fairness effect).
While most economists probably agree with this taxonomy, there is certainly no consensus
as to the magnitude of social interaction effects. Indeed, the very existence of these effects has
become a controversial area of research in economics. Measuring social interactions effects
raises difﬁcult identiﬁcation problems (Manski 1993) and they may prove hard to estimate
when they are identiﬁable (Mofﬁtt 2001, Blume and Durlauf 2005). Yet, even when appro-
priate data and econometric methods are used, they often turn out to be small or negligible
determinants of individual outcomes (e.g., Spicer and Hero 1985, Evans, et al. 1992, Aaron-
son 1998, Krauth 2006).
The identiﬁcation problem arises from the fact that interdependent behavior takes differ-
ent forms that are difﬁcult to isolate. In Manski’s (1993) terminology, the propensity of an
individual to evade may genuinely vary according to the behavior of the group (endogenous









































9the exogenous characteristics of the group members (exogenous interactions such as fairness
effects). Further, correlated outcomes need not arise from interdependent behavior alone. In-
deed, members of a given group may behave similarly because they have similar unobserved
characteristics or face similar institutional environments ( correlated effects).
In a linear-in-means regression-like model with social interactions, Manski (1993) has
shown that equilibrium outcomes cannot distinguish social effects (endogenous + exogenous)
from correlated effects. Moreover, even in the absence of correlated effects, simultaneity in
behaviorofinteractingagentsintroducesacollinearitybetweenthemeanoutcomeofthegroup
and its mean characteristics. This so-called “ reﬂection problem” hinders the identiﬁcation of
the endogenous effects from the exogenous effects. A number of researchers ( e.g., Brock and
Durlauf 2001b, Mofﬁtt 2001) have analyzed alternative models that allow for identiﬁcation
(e.g., nonlinearity of the mean endogenous group effect on individual behavior, exclusion
restrictions on exogenous interaction variables, randomized group composition). However,
the validity of these models rests on the credibility of the identifying assumptions imposed to
the model which in turn may depend on the nature of the data used to estimate the model.
Even when an interactions-based model is identiﬁed, its estimation raises serious econo-
metric problems. In particular, the mean group decision, which appears as a regressor, is likely
to be endogenous for two reasons. First, since individuals self-select within groups, they are
likely to face common shocks and their unobserved characteristics are likely to be highly cor-
related (sorting bias). Second, because individual and group behavior feed on one another, the
two variables are potentially simultaneously determined, at least when the groups are small
(simultaneity bias).
Several studies that correct for the sorting bias show that the endogenous interaction ef-
fects shrinks and sometimes completely disappear. For example, based on micro-simulation
estimation, Krauth (2006)has found that the actual peer effect on teen smokingis halved when
compared to standard estimation procedures. This result suggests that papers reporting impor-
tant peer effects should be taken cautiously if they ignore potential selection effects. Krauth
has also shown that the simultaneity bias may be important in small groups. Therefore the use
of appropriatedata and econometric modelsis required to providea robust test ofthe existence
of social interactions effects.
In this paper we estimate the impact of social interactions on tax evasion based on the
results of a laboratory experiment. Our approach takes into account both the identiﬁcation
and estimation problems related with the estimation of such a model. Moreover, we provide a
test for the existence of multiple equilibria. Participants receive a ﬁxed endowment and must
decide how much income to report given their tax rate and audit probability, given those faced
by the other members of their group, and given the group’s mean reported income. Each game










































9interactions. We thus extend the standard Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model by allowing for
social conformity and fairness effects.1 The model allows two types of two corner solutions:
no tax evasion or no tax compliance. This is important since 43% of all observations turn out
to be censored in our data.
Social interaction effects crucially depend upon how agents anticipate group behavior.
Two alternatives are considered. The ﬁrst assumes myopic expectations whereby decisions
are based on lagged group mean response. The second assumes self-consistent expectations
whereby decisions are based on the contemporaneous group mean response. In the former
case, a simple two-limit tobit model yields consistent parameter estimates under mild con-
ditions. In the latter case, a two-limit simultaneous tobit model must be used to account
for the endogeneity between individual and group responses. We exploit the non-linearities
generated by the truncated normal distribution of the endogenous variables to help identify
the model. We show that a unique social equilibrium exists when so-called “coherency con-
ditions” (Gouri´ eroux et al. 1980) are satisﬁed. In a sense, this approach extends Brock and
Durlauf’s (2001a) discrete choice model to the case where the censored choice variable is a
mix of discrete and continuous variables.
For the purpose of estimating the impact of social interactions on tax evasion, experimen-
tal data such as those we use have many advantages over alternative sources of information
(audited tax returns or randomized surveys). In particular, they allow to control the reference
group with whom individuals interact in the laboratory.2 Hence, because group size is de-
termined exogenously and membership assigned randomly, identiﬁcation of social interaction
effects is easier to achieve (Mofﬁtt 2001).3 Also, insofar as correlated effects persist, they can
be dealt with though the use of group ﬁxed effects, as long as many games are played by the
participants. This also help identify the model.
Experiments are useful in circumventing problems that are intrinsic to audit and survey
data. For instance the probability of auditing is generally related to the extent of underreport-
ing. Analyzes that use either type of data have to control for potential endogeneity biases. In
an experiment, the audit probability can be randomly assigned and unrelated to the intensity
1Because agents share the same information in our experimental setup, we do not consider social learning.
We nevertheless present a simple test for dynamic social learning and reject it strongly. See section 5.
2Audited tax returns usually do not reveal the nature of the reference group within which an individual may
interact. This information is required to estimate social conformity effects (Manski 2000). Also, though ran-
domized surveys can provide subjective information on the taxpayer’s reference group (e.g., Sheffrin and Triest
1992), a substantial fraction of tax evasion activities are likely to be underreported in these data (Elffers et al.
1987). Moreover tax evaders may overestimate the amount unreported by their peer group in order to better
justify their own behavior (cognitive dissonance bias).
3In practice however,randomassignment may not wash away entirely correlatedeffects since participants are
usually drawn from a restricted pool of volunteers who are likely to have similar unobservedcharacteristics (e.g.,









































9of evasion, thus avoiding the problem. In addition, the use of computerized devices avoids
measurement errors likely to distort ﬁeld data since decisions in the laboratory are perfectly
recorded.
Few attempts have been made to document the impact of social interactions on tax com-
pliance using experimental data. What little evidence exists is rather inconclusive. Recent
attempts have focused on criminal activities such as stealing (Falk and Fischbacher 2002) or
free riding in public goods games (Falk et al. 2004), but none has focused on tax compliance
per se. One notable exception is Bosco and Mittone (1997). In their setting, individuals re-
ceive a public good commensurate to the tax contributions of all group members. They have
found strong evidence that individual compliance is inﬂuenced by the reporting behavior of
other group members. In an older experiment, Alm et al. (1992) have similarly found that
compliance increases when taxpayers receive a public good in exchange for their payment. In
our setup, contrary to most experimental studies, individual monetary payoffs do not depend
on the other participants’ behavior. This allows us to better isolate the effect of social inter-
actions. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to analyze the reﬂection problem using
experimental data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical
model. Section 3 describes the experiment. Section 4 discusses the econometric approach.
Section 5 discusses the main features of the data and presents the econometric results. Ac-
cording to our ﬁndings, equilibrium outcomes are consistent with (anti-)conformity effects
when expectations are assumed to be self-consistent and the endogeneity of group response is
not accounted for. When expectations are assumed to be myopic, the (anti-)conformity effect
is still signiﬁcant but much less important. Finally, it is no longer statistically signiﬁcant when
endogeneity is taken into account and self-consistent expectations are assumed. Our results
also provide some evidence of fairness effects but systematically reject correlated effects. As
expected, individual tax rates, audit probabilities, gender and inequality aversion all have a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on tax compliance behavior. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 A Model of Tax Evasion with Social Interactions
2.1 Modelling the individual tax evasion decision
In this section we introduce endogenous and exogenous social interactions among taxpayers
into the standard Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki tax evasion model.4 Consider individual i who










































9belongs to a reference group of size N, N being exogenous. His decision horizon is one
period. His before-tax income I, normalized to 1, is unknown to the tax authority and is
exogenous. For simplicity, assume all individuals in the group have the same income. The
individual faces a ﬂat tax rate ti on his reported income, Di. He must decide how much
income to report knowing that with probability pi his tax return will be audited. If caught
cheating he must pay the amount of evaded tax, tiFi, with Fi = 1 − Di, plus a commensurate
penalty θtiFi, with θ > 0. For simplicity, the penalty rate is assumed the same for everyone.
If the individual is not audited, his net income will be 1−tiDi. If he is audited his net income
will be 1−tiDi−(1+θ)tiFi = 1−tiDi−(1+θ)ti(I−Di). Expected utility, EUi, is assumed
to consist of two separable components:
EUi = {(1 − pi)u(1 − tiDi) + piu(1 − tiDi − (1 + θ)ti(1 − Di))} + S(Di,Xi). (1)
The ﬁrst component within braces is the private expected utility associated with tax compli-
ance behavior, that is, with a choice of Di. Assuming that the individual is risk averse, private
utility u( ) is increasing and concave in consumption. The second component, S(Di,Xi) , is
the social (ex-ante) utility associated with tax compliance. This component is assumed to de-
pend on reported income, Di, and on a vector Xi of exogenous variables to be deﬁned below.5
The marginal social utility of tax compliance, si ≡ ∂S/∂Di, is assumed to depend only on
Xi : si = s(Xi). Therefore S(Di,Xi) is an afﬁne function of Di and can be written as:




The vector Xi includes a number of variables. First, we assume that the marginal social util-
ity of tax compliance depends on D
e
−i , individual i’s subjective expectation of the mean tax
compliance of the other members of his reference group. A positive effect corresponds to a
social conformity effect.6 In that case, preferences exhibit so-called strategic complementar-
ities (Brock and Durlauf 2001a). A negative effect corresponds to a social anti-conformity
effect (strategic substitutabilities). In that case the individual prefers to deviate from the tax
compliance behavior of his reference group. Second, given that participants receive the same
Both Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Alm, McClelland and Schulze (1992) provide some evidence that
individuals overweight low probabilities of audit. Robben, Webley, Weigel et al. (1990) show that taxpayers
evade more when they perceive the tax system to be unfair and the audit probability low (“equity theory”). On
the otherhand, KingandSheffrin(2002)haveconductedan experimentbasedon framedquestionsthatlead them
to conclude that subjects behave more in accordance with expected utility theory than with either the prospect
theory or the equity theory.
5Theseparabilityassumptionbetweenprivateandsocialutilitiesisrelativelycommon. SeeBrockandDurlauf
(2001a).
6Myles and Naylor (1996) assume that the conformity effect is limited to the evasion decision. In our more
general approach, the evaded amount (not only the evasion decision) can be inﬂuenced by the behavior of other









































9before-tax income, the individual’s marginal social utility is assumed to be increasing with his
group’s tax rate, t−i, and his group’s audit probability, p−i , given his own tax rate and audit
probabilityrate(fairnesseffects).7 Finally,Xi includesasub-vectorAi ofobservableattributes
( e.g., gender), a sub-vector A−i of the corresponding mean observable attributes of the other
membersand therealization ofarandom termǫi that capturesunobservableindividual-speciﬁc
attributesand attributesthatarecommontoall individualsinthegroup.8 Thetheoreticalmodel
and its econometric counterpart are linked through εi.
We assume that the public goods funded by the tax receipts do not enter the individual’s
utility and therefore have no bearing on tax evasion decisions. Substituting equations (3) and
(2) into (1) and assuming that preferences satisfy the Von Neuman-Morgenstern axioms, the
individual’s problem is to choose how much income to report, Di, so as to maximize his
expected utility (1) subject to the inequality conditions 0 ≤ Di ≤ 1.
The optimal level of reported income can be derived from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Instead, we present an equivalent formulation that is more in line with our econometric spec-
iﬁcation. Let us ﬁrst solve the optimization problem while ignoring the inequality conditions
on Di. The equation for D∗







Because theindividual’sincomeand penalty rateθ are assumedconstantthey are omittedfrom
(4). Given the inequality conditions on Di , the relationship between the (observed) variable
Di and the latent (unobserved) variable D∗
i is:




i + 1 I(D
∗
i ≥ 1), (5)
where 1 I(a) is an indicator function for the event a.
From this model we can derive six predictions regarding tax evasion:
1. A risk-averse individual will always underreport his income ( i.e., Di < 1) whenever
1 − s(Xi)/tu′(1 − t) − pi(1 + θ) > 0, that is, whenever the expected return on evaded
taxes is strictly positive, with due allowance for the marginal social cost of tax evasion,
s(Xi)/tu′(1 − t).The latter will be positive if tax compliance yields a positive social
marginal utility (s(Xi) > 0). Interestingly, simple expected utility models predict much
lower compliance rates than what is usually observed in practice (see Andreoni et al.
7To simplify the presentation, we do not include ti and pi in the vector Xi, that is, we ignore the fairness
effects associated with changes in the individual’s tax rate or audit probability. However, these effects are taken
into account in the estimation of the reduced-form model.
8The vectors A andA−i andthe scalar εi couldalso inﬂuencethe privateutility componentof the individual’s









































91998). The difference may be partly attributable to the omission of this marginal social
cost.
The next ﬁve predictions concern the impact of exogenous variables on the amount
reported by individual i assuming an interior solution:
2. ∂Di/∂ti =?, assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion;




5. ∂Di/∂t−i ≥ 0 ;
6. ∂Di/∂p−i ≥ 0.
Proposition (2) states that the impact of an increase in the tax rate on tax compliance can
be positiveor negative. The impact can be decomposed into two components of opposite sign.
The ﬁrst is positive(see Yitzhaki 1974) and has raised a lot of discussion in the literature since
it is rather counter-intuitive. It arises because the penalty is proportional to the amount of
evaded tax. Therefore an increase in the tax rate involves no substitution effect between the
individual’s private consumption when he is audited and when he is not. Because it reduces
income, however, the individual is induced to cheat less if his absolute risk aversion decreases
with income. The second effect derives from the social component in the utility function.
Because the marginal cost (in terms of paid taxes) of tax compliance increases with the tax
rate, the individual reduces his level of tax compliance. Therefore, our model shows that
adding a social component to the utility function may generate a positiverelationship between
tax rates and tax evasion.
Proposition (3) was ﬁrst derived by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and states that an in-
crease in the audit probability increases tax compliance. Proposition (4) states that an increase
in the mean reported income by the reference group may increase tax compliance (social con-
formityeffect) or decrease it (anti-conformity effect). Finally, propositions(5)and (6) indicate
that an increase in the tax rate or in the audit probability of an individual’s group increases his
tax compliance (fairness effects). Propositions (4)–(6) derive from the fact that an increase in
the marginal social utility of tax compliance, si, induces the individual to report more income
to the tax authority.
2.2 Social equilibrium with tax evasion
We assume that an individual acts non-cooperatively and does not take into account the effect









































9decision conditional upon his expectations about his group’s mean reported income, D
e
−i.
To close the model, we must state explicitly how individuals form their expectations and in
particular how these relate to the information available at the time the decision is made. This
issue is crucial because the estimates of the social conformity effect are intimately related to
the expectations formation mechanism.
Prior to discussing how expectations are formed, some elements of the experimental setup
must ﬁrst be described. Each group plays ﬁve separate interactive rounds. At the beginning
of each round, tax rates and audit probabilities are randomly assigned to group members and
remain constant for the duration of the round. Each round is broken-down into periods. At
the end of each period, once every group member has recorded his decision, D−i is computed
and reported to each member i. The game is repeated a sufﬁcient number of periods to insure
convergence is reached. The convergence criterion is expressed as






τ−2   
  ≤
.05.9
Given the above experimental setup, we consider two alternative expectation formation
mechanisms. The ﬁrst assumes expectations are based on the group’s mean reported income
in the preceding period (myopic expectations). An important advantage of assuming myopic
expectations is its simplicity. If one further assumes that the random terms are not autocorre-
lated, the variable D
e
−i (which, in this case, is equal to D
τ−1
−i for t ≥ 2) is exogenous. 10 The
model is thus identiﬁed if the correlated effects can be accounted for by group ﬁxed effects.
The main weakness of this approach are that is it based on an ad hoc assumption about the
appropriate lag length. Also, it implies that individualscan make systematicforecasting errors
without ever adjusting their expectations.
The second alternative assumes that expectations are based on the contemporaneous group
mean reported income (self-consistent expectations). If there exists a social equilibrium, it
follows that D
e
−i ≃ D−i which is a property of the (Nash) social equilibrium.11 This approach
thus allows us to assume self-consistent beliefs when estimating the model. The equilib-
rium condition of the model is thus obtained by setting D
e
−i = D−i and replacing D−i by
1
N−1(DN − Di) in the latent equation (4). Substituting this equation into (5) and solving for
Di as a function of D and xi, we get Di = D(D,xi). Adding over N and dividing by N we
9Obviously the convergence criterion can only be computed after two periods. After ten iterations, the round
is stopped if no convergence has been reached and the round is discarded. See Section 3.
10Our econometric model allows for autocorrelation due to unobservable (to the econometrician) invariant
group characteristics, since the latter are taken into account by group ﬁxed effects.
11If there are innovations in the random term εi at each period (εi becomes εit) and individuals do not



















































where x is the vector of all exogenous individual and policy variables of the model. Since
G(D,x) is continuous and the support of D is compact, it follows from Brouwer’s ﬁxed point
theorem that there must exist at least one solution for D that satisﬁes this condition. As argued
by Brock and Durlauf (2001b), multipleequilibria are a common feature of interactions-based
models such as (6). We will take up this issue in Section 4 and we will show that it is related
to the coherency conditions in the model to be estimated.
3 The Experiment
The purpose of our experiment is to generate data to estimateand test our model of tax evasion
with endogenous and exogenous social interactions. This section presents the experimental
design and discusses its external validity, that is, how its results could be generalized to the
larger population.
3.1 Experimental Design
Our experiment comprises two parts (see instructions in Appendix A). The ﬁrst part of the
experiment, which is mainly used to help participants to learn how to play the games, consists
of 5 rounds. To facilitate decision-making, this part excludes endogenous social interactions
and therefore information on group behavior is not disclosed (“NOINFO” treatment). Each
group is composed of 15 participants. At the beginning of each round, each participant re-
ceives the same initial exogenous “endowment” of 100 experimental currency units (ECU)
which constitutes his income. He is requested to give back a percentage of his income (a
“deduction rate”). There are 5 different tax rates, with each rate randomly assigned to 3 par-
ticipants. This is common knowledge. Each participant is told that these paybacks will go into
scientiﬁc research funds (i.e., the lab gets this amount of money back). To satisfy this request,
the participant must report an amount between 0 and 100 that will be partly taxed back. He is
informed that his reported income can be audited according to a certain probability and that
this audit will entail the payment of a ﬁne (a “penalty”) if the reported income is less than his









































9each audit probability randomly assigned to 3 participants.12 This is also common knowledge.
The participants are informed that the probabilities are independent of the reported amounts.
It should be noted that the distribution of individual tax rates is independent of the distribution
of the audit probabilities.
To simplify decision-making, a scrollbar on the computer screen indicates for each possi-
ble value of reported income the payoffs if not audited and if caught cheating.13 At the end of
each round, once all participants have validated their decision on the keyboard, a new round
starts automatically. There is no feed-back about actual audits and payoffs before the whole
session is completed. This limits the presence of wealth effects during the experiment that
may distort compliance behavior. At the beginning of each new round a new series of tax
rates and audit probabilities are reassigned to the group members. We deliberately alternate
between medium, low and high tax and audit regimes and this order is kept constant across
sessions to ease comparisons. This was however not common knowledge. Even if subjects
had been able to anticipate this order, it could not affect their behavior after being audited
since they received no feed back on actual audits.
The second part of the experiment also consists of 5 rounds. It corresponds to the so-
called information condition (“INFO” treatment). Two main changes are introduced in the
protocol. The ﬁrst change relates to the structure of the rounds. The second to the informa-
tional feedback. Each round now includes up to 10 periods. The idea is to allow convergence
in decision making to reach social equilibrium. In the ﬁrst period of a new round, new tax and
audit regimes are assigned for the whole round. From the second period on, each participant
receives a feedback about the group behavior in the previous period. Hence, the number of
evaders among the 14 other group members and their mean reported income appear on the
screen. During a round, individual tax rates and audit probabilities are ﬁxed. A new period
is launched until the convergence criteria is equal to or lower than 5% in absolute value. All
the other parameters of the protocol remain unchanged during a round. If convergence is not
achieved within 10 periods, a new round is initiated.
By combiningvarious tax rates and audit probabilitiestheexperimentmimicsa large range
of tax regimes (see Appendix B). A total of 12 sessions were carried out, each involving 10
rounds. The sessions were subdivided into 3 sets. For each one, 3 different tax and audit
regimes (high, medium, low) were used. In all, we thus experimented with 9 tax regimes and
9 audit regimes, yielding as many as 45 individual tax and audit rates.
12Allocating audit probabilities as a function of past detected cheating behavior would have increased the
realism of the experiment and enabled social learning, but it would also have made the results less comparable
with past experiments, the rules of the game considerably more complex and the convergenceprocess slower.
13Therefore, during the experiment, the subjects were fully aware of the risk of losses associated with each of
their decision. 61 observations indicate a loss in a round but these losses were largely compensated by earnings
in other rounds. All subjects earned considerably more than their show-up fee and nobody left the laboratory









































9At the end of their session, participants were asked to ﬁll an anonymous post-experimental
questionnaire. This questionnaire aimed at collecting information about individual charac-
teristics such as age, gender and college major. An additional item was added to elicit the
individual degree of inequality aversion. Participants had to imagine a situation involving the
sharing of a pie among two persons (excluding themselves in order to get less emotional de-
cision). They were asked to indicate their favorite share among two possibilities. They had to
make three consecutive choices. The alternative shares were (50,50) against (55,65), (50,50)
against (45,70), and (50,50) against (35,85). Rejection of a greater pie but more unequally
shared can be considered a signal of a high inequality aversion. An index of inequality aver-
sion (between 0 and 2) is included in some speciﬁcations of the model as a control variable.14
This experiment was performed at GATE (Groupe d’Analyse et de Th´ eorie Economique,
France) using the Regate software (Zeiliger 2000). Participants were volunteer undergrad-
uate and graduate students from four business and engineer schools and university. A total
of 180 students participated in this experiment. Since each session consisted of 10 rounds,
this provides a total of 1800 observations (900 for each of NOINFO and INFO treatments).
Excluding rounds which did not achieve convergence leaves a total of 795 observations for
the INFO treatment. Participants were paid in cash in a separate room. A show-up fee of 3
e, was added to cover participation expenses and participants who answered the questions on
inequality aversion received an additional 1.5 e. The average earning was 13.77 e.
3.2 External Validity
Laboratory experiments are often criticized because they may not properly reﬂect natural en-
vironments. In our particular setting, one may question the artiﬁcial character of the reference
groups, the contextual framework and the nature of the information made available to the
participants in each round. We address each in turn.
We acknowledgethat interacting with an artiﬁcial reference group may be a poor proxy for
real-life interactions. In our game, the reference group is exogenously imposed and consists
of all thosewho happen to show-up at a given session. Yet this approach presents an important
advantage: Every subject interacts with a single well-deﬁned reference group of the same size.
Analyzing social interactions is thus made much easier than when using survey data. Indeed,
because these hardly ever provide any information about reference groups, the analyst often
assumes individuals interact with those who share similar attributes: age, education, income,
vicinity, etc. (e.g., van Praag and Frijters 1999). This is precisely what we do in our exper-
14The index, F, is constructed as followed. We ﬁrst deﬁne three dummies Vi(i = 1,2,3) associated to the
three consecutive choices above, with Vi = 1 when the choice is (50,50). We set F = 0 when V1 = 0,V2 = 0
and V3 = 0 or when V1 = 0,V2 = 0 and V3 = 1 (low aversion), F = 2 when V1 = 1,V2 = 1 and V3 = 1 or









































9iment: participants are all students of nearly the same age, enrolled in the local engineering
and business schools, and living in the vicinity of Lyon. Despite being artiﬁcially generated,
laboratory reference groups may nevertheless closely mimic real-life reference groups.
In designing the experiment, we have purposely chosen not to contextualize the game:
Participants were not told the decisions were about tax evasion and neutral wording was used
throughout to avoid framing effects.15 Although we have refrained from using terms such as
“fraud” or “tax evasion”, we can reasonably assume that subjects understood they were re-
quired to report the entirety of their endowment to avoid punishment. The notion of “penalty”
and “ﬁne” should have made it clear that under-reporting meant cheating. Lastly, contrary to
previous experiments, subjects were informed about their peer’s behavior. It was nevertheless
important to keep the rest of the protocol as standard as possible so that our results could be
compared to those of previous experiments. This is why tax rates or audit probabilities were
randomly assigned.
Finally, the external validity of the experiment may be jeopardized by the fact that partic-
ipants are probably more informed than real-life tax evaders. Indeed, tax evasion is usually
not observed or revealed to peers or outsiders to avoid guilt, shame or being reported to the
tax authority. The reason participants are provided information about the true mean reported
income and the number of evaders is to avoid strategic behavior. Allowing individual misre-
porting would have made the mean uninformative and would have seriously compromise our
ability to identify the impact of social interactions.
4 Econometric model
In this section we discuss the econometric methodology used to estimate the model. In the
presentation, we assume that individual expectations are based on contemporaneous values of
the group’s mean reported income (self-consistent expectations).16 To ease our task, the latent















ik is a latent variable for the desired amount of income reported by individual i in
group g at round k, i = 1,...,N, g = 1,...G, k = 1...K; x
g
ik is a corresponding row vector of
15Alm (1988) suggests that decisions made in a such a setting better reﬂect subjects’ preferences. Alm et al.
(1992) conclude that the use of neutral rather loaded wording does not change behavior, while King and Sheffrin
(2002) show that subjects are reluctant to evade taxes even when using frames to stress the unfairness of the tax
regimes.










































9observableexogenous variables (including a constant term), β and δ are vectors of parameters,
cg represents unobservable group-speciﬁc attributes and η
g
ik is an error term capturing the
effects of unobservable individual-speciﬁc attributes that may vary across rounds. Since the
correlation between participants is taken into account by the component cg, one assumes that
η
g





























In this model γ is the endogenous social interaction effect. If positive, participants conform
to group behavior, while if negative, they deviate from the group behavior. The vector δ
captures the exogenous effects (including the fairness effect). To model the correlated effects
two approaches can be used. The group random effects approach treats cg as a random term
assuming it is orthogonal to the exogenous variables: ǫ
g
ik = cg + η
g
ik. The group ﬁxed effects
approach allows cg to be arbitrarily correlated with the exogenous variables. This method
is more general and in fact much easier to implement than the former approach. We follow
Aronsson et al. (1999) and use the group ﬁxed effects approach. There are thus G−1 dummy
variables to be estimated, one for each group, save one to allow identiﬁcation. Following
Kooreman (2006), the N equations in (7) corresponding to those associated with round k of








































Cg is a (G − 1) row vector of group-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, dg is a (G − 1) column vector
of dummy variables, ιN is a N × 1 column vector of ones, and η
g
k is a vector of error terms
distributed as N(0,σ2I). Recall that the reported income is normalized between 0 and 1. The
relationship between the observed vector D
g
k of reported incomes and the corresponding la-
tent vector is given by D
g




i + 1 I(D
g∗
i ≥ 1), where as before 1 I( ) is
a vector of indicator functions which take the value one or zero. Equation (8) corresponds
to a simultaneous equation two-limit tobit with within- and cross-equation restrictions on pa-
rameters (see matrix Γ) and with error terms uncorrelated across equations. It involves both
latent variables and their observed counterparts. Amemyia (1974) was the ﬁrst to consider









































9The estimation of (8) raises two distinct problems that must be addressed separately: the
so-called coherency problem and the identiﬁcation problem. The coherency problem (see
Gouri´ eroux et al. 1980) consists in ﬁnding the condition which guarantees the system has a
well-deﬁned unique reduced form. In a general linear-in-means model, the coherency condi-
tion reduces to the invertibility of I − Γ, the matrix of coefﬁcients of the endogenous vari-
ables. In a latent linear-in-means model with censored endogenous variables such as (8) the
coherency condition is more restrictive. Indeed, Amemyia (1974) has shown that every prin-
cipal minor of the matrix I −Γ must be positive. This coherency condition clearly implies the
existence of a unique social equilibrium at each round k of session g. In the empirical section,
this condition is veriﬁed for each speciﬁcation of the structural model.
In a sense, the coherency problem precedes the identiﬁcation problem. Indeed, the latter
refers to the uniqueness of the parameters of the structural model given the parameters of the
reduced form model. Identiﬁcation therefore assumes the existence of a well-deﬁned reduced
form. As discussed above, estimating social interactions models raises serious identiﬁcation
problems. Results from Manski (1993) imply that it is impossible to identify the structural





ki for all i,k and g) and without a priori restrictions on the parameters
of δ or on the distribution of η
g
k. The reason is that the order condition for identiﬁcation in a
structural linear model is not satisﬁed (Mofﬁtt 2001).
Two reasonsexplainswhyourmodelisidentiﬁed. First, modelswithendogenouscensored
variables such as (8) may be easier to identify than linear-in-means models. Due to the non-
linear relationship between observed reported income and the corresponding latent variable,
the model imposes a nonlinear relationship between the individual behavior and the mean be-
havior of the reference group. As emphasized by Brock and Durlauf (2001b), this is likely to
solve the identiﬁcation problem since nonlinear models with self-consistent beliefs are most
likely to be identiﬁed.17 From the econometric point of view, this result is consistent with the
idea that nonlinearity generally helps rather than hampers identiﬁcation. It is important to note
however that identiﬁcation hinges on knowing the speciﬁc form of nonlinearity which, in our
case, depends on the assumption of normality of the error terms. Second, our model imposes




k ∼ N(0,σ2I). These restrictions follow
from the fact that the correlations between individual disturbances are assumed to be taken
into account by the group ﬁxed effects. The latter can be estimated because participants play
many games.








−ik,1) and α =
(β,γ,δ,cg)
′






ik. For any given round k in
17They derive conditions for identiﬁcation in the case of a discrete-choice generalized logistic model of social
interactions and show that they are much less restrictive than for the linear-in-means model. However they do
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to α and σ yields the full information maximum likelihood estimates of the model. Under
standard regularity assumptions, these estimates are consistent and asymptotically efﬁcient.
5 Results
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our sample. Most subjects are young and males out-
number females. Both tax rates and audit probabilities display a large standard deviation (see
also Appendix B). This helps to identify their impact on tax compliance behavior. Over 88%
(53/60) of all rounds with feedback information on the tax compliance satisfy the convergence
criterion and therefore correspond to a social equilibrium. This leaves 795 observations on
reported income in part II of the experiment (INFO treatment) out of 900 potential observa-
tions.18 In the INFO treatment, 24.5% of these observations (195) are censored at zero while
19% (151 observations) are censored at 100 for a total of 43.5% censored observations (346).
The corresponding percentages in the NOINFO treatments are 18% (164 observations), 21%
(189 observations) and 39% (353), respectively. Finally, the average reported income in the
INFO treatment (50.15)is about half the initial endowmentand slightlylowerthan the average
reported income in the NOINFO treatment (53.92).
Table 2 reports detailed estimation results for various speciﬁcations of the model. The
econometric results focus mainly on the INFO treatment, though the last column of the table
(column (8)) reports results from the NOINFO treatment. Column (1) provides results for a
full linear-in-means model in which individual and corresponding group mean variables are
included as regressors. There are thus no exclusion restrictions on exogenous interactions
variables. Correlated effects are taken into account through 11 group dummies. While the
18In the econometric analysis, we excluded rounds that did not converge after ten rounds to avoid a misspec-
iﬁcation bias. Basically, we assumed (but could not test) that these rounds would have converged to a social
equilibriumhad we allowed the roundsto include more than ten periods. Of course, this may generate a selection
problem (due to choice-based sampling). To provide some evidence on this point, we estimated the probability
that round j converges as a function of the characteristics of the round and of the participants in this round (age,
gender, individual tax rate, the probability of being audited,...) and none of these variables was signiﬁcant at the









































9audit probability, pi, is entered linearly, the tax rate, ti, is entered with a linear and a quadratic
term since our theoretical model predicts its impact on tax compliance can be decomposed
into the sum of two opposite effects. No other individual characteristics are included in this
speciﬁcation. Importantly, results in column (1) assume that individual expectations are based
on contemporaneous group mean reported income (self-consistent expectations). The model
is estimated by a simple two-limit tobit model and thus ignores the potential simultaneity
between group and individual behavior. Since there are only 15 participants in each session,
this omission may signiﬁcantly bias the estimate of the endogenous social effect. Results in
column (1) show that, contrary to expectations, the parameter estimate of D−i is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This is oppositeto the social conformity effect because
an increase in mean group tax evasion induces individuals to be more compliant.
There are at least four reasons why such a result may obtain. First, tax evasion behavior
may induce a social anti-conformity rather than a social conformity effect. In other words,
participants may be inclined to deviate from the reference group’s behavior. Wenzel (2004)
argues that, at least in the ﬁeld of tax evasion, social norms may induce deviation from mean
group response if the latter is inconsistent with individuals’ internal norms. Kooreman (2006)
obtains such an anti-conformity effect when studying student self-esteem: the lower the group
self-esteem, the higher the individual self-esteem. In our tax evasion experiment social anti-
conformity is unlikely, although it can not be completely ruled out. Second, since the tax
yields are used to ﬁnance scientiﬁc research, altruistic behavior may induce individuals to
contribute more when the others reduce their contribution. This explanation is also unlikely
to explain much of the tax evasion behavior of the participants. A third interpretation is that
individuals may reduce their tax evasion whenever the group evades more out of fear this may
trigger a higher audit rate in further rounds. This is also unlikely because participants were
instructed at the outset that audit regimes are exogenous. Finally, the most likely explanation
is that the parameter estimate of D−i is biased because the simple two-limit tobit omits the
potential simultaneity between individual and group responses. Recall that this bias may arise
from the fact that individual and group behavior feed on one another. Mofﬁtt (2001) and
Krauth (2006) insist on the potential importance of this bias when the number of individuals
in the reference group is small.
As mentioned earlier, two alternative approaches are used to tackle the simultaneity prob-
lem. Results in columns (2) and (3) assume that expectations are myopic and that the error
terms are not autocorrelated. Under these assumptions, a simple two-limit tobit provides con-
sistent estimators. In column (2), the parameter estimate of D−i (= D
τ−1
−i ), while still nega-
tive, is now much smaller (-0.813 rather than -2.966). Moreover, it is no longer statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level, though it remains signiﬁcant at the 10% level (Student t = 1.74).
This indicates that the simultaneity problem is potentially important and may partly explain









































9expectations and uses a simultaneous two-limit tobit model (see equation (9)). Columns (4)
to (6) provide results based on this approach. Note ﬁrst that the model in column (4) imposes
no exclusion restrictions. Identiﬁcation of the parameter estimates thus rests entirely on the
response variables being censored and on the error terms assumed to be normally distributed
with zero covariances. The second thing to notice is that the speciﬁcations of columns (4)–(6)
all satisfy the coherency conditionsince the principal minors of the matrix I−Γ are positivein
each case. This implies that there are no multiple equilibria in our experiment. In column (4)
the parameter estimate of D−i is now close to zero (= −0.046) and is no longer statistically
signiﬁcant even at the 10% level (Student t = 0.99). This result is robust to changes in model
speciﬁcation and indicates that there is no endogenous interaction effects in our experiment,
either under the assumption of myopic expectations (at the 5% level) or self-consistent ex-
pectations (even at the 10% level). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that when
the mean behavior of the group does not affect the individual monetary payoffs, there is no
endogenous social interactions associated with tax evasion (Spicer and Hero 1985).
The results allow us to investigate the existence of exogenous interactions since the tax
rate and the audit probability are included both at the individual, (ti, pi), and group, (t−i,
p−i), levels in all speciﬁcations. Because the parameter estimates of t−i and t2
−i are not
individually signiﬁcant in speciﬁcation (2) but are jointly signiﬁcant at the 5% level (χ2
= 6.37 ∼ χ2(2,.05) = 5.99), we have excluded t2
−i in speciﬁcation (3) to ease interpretation.
The parameter estimate of t−i is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level.This lends support to
the existence of a fairness effect in terms of horizontal equity because individuals are inclined
to report more when the ﬁscal treatment of their group worsens. Spicer and Becker (1980)
have also found that individuals who were told their tax rates were below average reported
relatively higher amounts.19 On the other hand, the parameter estimate of p−i is not signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero in all speciﬁcations (except in column (1)) thereby rejecting fairness
effects relative to the fraud preventing policy.
According to the parameter estimates of ti and t2
i in column (5), a one percentage point
increase in the individual tax rate decreases desired reported income by a small amount (=
−0.0426) at the mean tax rate (¯ t = 0.38). The estimates also predict that the positive impact
occurs only at tax rates above 39.1%. Below that level the negative effect dominates and
induces more tax evasion. As discussed in the theoretical model, both positive and negative
effects are consistent with our model when tax compliance yields a positive social marginal
utility.
Interestingly, experimental results on the impact of tax rates on compliance are not clear
cut. Some studies have found that increased tax rates decrease compliance (Friedland et al
1978; Collins and Plumlee 1991), while others have found the opposite to hold (Alm et al.










































91995). Studies based on survey data yield similarly contradictory results (see Andreoni et al.
1998). Feinstein (1991) and Alm et al. (1993) conclude that an increase in the marginal tax
rate lowers tax evasion, whereas Clotfelter (1983) obtains a positive elasticity of underreport-
ing with respect to the marginal tax rate.
In all speciﬁcations, the parameter estimate of pi is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. This result is consistent with the Alingham-Sandmo proposition according to which an
increase in the audit probability reduces tax evasion, but also with evidence based on survey
data (Friedland et al. 1978, Klepper and Nagin 1989, Dubin, Graetz and Wilde 1990, Slemrod
et al. 2001).
In column (6), the gender variable (Sexi) and the inequality aversion index (Aversi) are
added to the model with self-consistent expectations. 20 As in many studies, women are
found to evade less than men (e.g., Spicer and Becker 1980, Baldry 1986). According to the
parameter estimate of gender, ceteris paribus, females report on average 14.7 more units than
males. As for the inequality index, its parameter estimate is positive and signiﬁcant at the
5% level, thus indicating that those with a high inequality aversion are likely to evade less,
ceteris paribus. Note however that including the gender variable and the inequality aversion
index has little impact on the other parameter estimates of the model (compare columns (5)
and (6)).21 With respect to correlated effects, only one group dummy (g9) is signiﬁcant at the
5% level. However, a likelihood ratio test based on column (6) rejects the null assumption that
all group dummies are zero. Our results are thus consistent with the presence of correlated
effects.22
Column (7) reports estimation results where endogenous effects are assumed away. As
expected, the fairness effect on taxation is signiﬁcant at the 5% level and its value is close to
the one obtained when expectations are assumed to be myopic (see column (3)).
Finally, column (8) provides results of a simple two-limit tobit using information from
the NOINFO treatment (900 observations). Results are qualitatively quite similar to those
obtained using the INFO treatment ( e.g., compare with columns (6) or (7)) though the co-
efﬁcients of ti and t2
i change signs. Interestingly, the coefﬁcients associated with the audit
probability, the gender and the inequality aversion index are all smaller in the NOINFO treat-
ment. This is consistent with the existence of a social multiplier effect. However it would
be premature to draw any strong conclusion from these observations since learning effects
20The estimation never converged when we included the group mean gender variable. This variable was thus
excluded from the speciﬁcation. Besides, no other individual characteristic was signiﬁcant.
21We also tested for “dynamic social learning effects” by including dummy variables for each round. None
were ever signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
22Inthespeciﬁcationwherethegroupdummiesareremoved,themeangroupgendervariable(sex−i) becomes









































9in the latter treatment (that was implemented earlier in the experiment)are likely to be much
important than in the INFO treatment.
6 Conclusion
Research on tax evasion usually ignores “peer effects” or “social interactions effects”. This
omission is due to the fact that testing for such effects is notoriously difﬁcult for two reasons.
First, outcomes data rarely reveal the reference group composition, whether it is the family,
the neighborhood, or work colleagues. Second, even when the group composition is known,
estimating interaction-based models raises severe identiﬁcation problems.
The identiﬁcation problem arises from the fact that interdependent behavior takes differ-
ent forms that are difﬁcult to isolate. In a linear-in-means regression-like model with social
interactions, equilibrium outcomes cannot distinguish between endogenous effects from ex-
ogenous effects or correlated effects. Furthermore, even when an interactions-based model is
identiﬁed, its estimation raises serious econometric problems.
In this paper we argue that laboratory experiments can be useful in solvingthese problems.
Reference groups are naturally deﬁned as participants in each particular session. Randomiza-
tion of participants across groups limits correlated effects and sorting biases. Moreover, group
ﬁxed effects can be used to take into account correlated effects. This clearly helps identify the
endogenous and exogenous interactions effects. The particular setup of our experiment has an
added beneﬁt. Because it generates censored data, it naturally implies a nonlinear relationship
between individual and group responses, assuming normality of the error terms. Assuming
that the group ﬁxed effects wash away the correlated effects, this nonlinearity allows identiﬁ-
cation of the model without the need to impose any identifying restrictions.
In line with the recent empirical literature on social interactions, we ﬁnd that the esti-
mation method is crucial in obtaining consistent estimates of interaction effects. Thus when
we assume that individual tax evasion behavior is affected by contemporaneous mean group
behavior (self-consistent expectations) but ignore the simultaneity of individual and group re-
sponses, we ﬁnd strong evidence of social anti-conformity effects. This effect is considerably
reduced when we assume expectations are based on group mean lagged response (myopic
expectations). Moreover, the effect completely disappears under self-consistent expectations
once the simultaneity between individual and group responses is taken into account using an
appropriate estimation method (two-limit simultaneous tobit).
We also ﬁnd fairness effects in term of horizontal equity: for a given gross income and
a given personal tax rate, the individual will report less when facing a reduction in the mean









































9policy level this means that a taxation system that is more horizontally equitable is likely to
improve tax compliance.
As noted by many (e.g., Manski 2000), experimental research has its own limitations. In
our experiment groups are formed artiﬁcially for the sake of the experiment. Caution must
thus be exercised when extrapolating our ﬁndings to the population of taxpayers.
References
[1] Aaronson, D. (1998). Using Sibling Data to Estimate the Impact of Neigborhoods on
Children’s Educational Outcomes. Journal of Human Resources 33, 915-46.
[2] Akerlof, G.A. (1980). A Theory of Social Custom of Which UnemploymentMay be One
Consequence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 94(4), 749-75.
[3] Allingham, M.G., Sandmo, A. (1972). Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis.
Journal of Public Economics 1, 323-38.
[4] Alm, J., Bahl, R., Murray, M.N. (1993). Audit Selection and Income Tax Underreporting
in the Tax Compliance Game. Journal of Development Economics 42(1), 1-33.
[5] Alm, J., Jackson, B., McKee, M. (1992). Deterrence and Beyond: Toward a Kinder, Gen-
tler IRS. In Slemrod, J. (Ed.), Tax Compliance and Tax Law Enforcement. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 311-32.
[6] Alm, J., Jackson, B., McKee, M. (1992). Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Com-
pliance with Experimental Data. National Tax Journal 45 (1), 107-114.
[7] Alm, J., McClelland, G.H., Schulze, W.D. (1992). Why do people pay taxes? Journal of
Public Economics 48, 21-38.
[8] Alm, J., McClelland, G.H., Schulze, W.D. (1999). Changing the Social Norm of Com-
pliance by Voting. Kyklos 52, 141-171.
[9] Alm, J., Sanchez, I., de Juan, A. (1995). Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax
Compliance. Kyklos 48, 3-18.
[10] Amemiya, T. (1974). Multivariate Regression and Simultaneous Equation Model when
the Dependent Variables are Truncated Normal, Econometrica, 6, 999-1012.










































9[12] Aronsson, T., Blomquist, S., Sacklen, H. (1999). Identifying Interdependent Behaviour
in an Empirical Model of Labour Supply. Journal of Applied Econometrics 14(6), 607-
26.
[13] Baldry, J.C. (1986). Tax Evasion is not a Gamble. Economics Letters 22, 333-5.
[14] Blume, L., Durlauf, S.N. (2005), Identifying Social Interactions: a Review. Mimeo.
[15] Bosco, L., Mittone, L. (1997). Tax evasion and moral constraints: some experimental
evidence. Kyklos 50, 297-324.
[16] Brock, W.A., Durlauf, S.N. (2001a). Discrete Choice with Social Interactions. Review of
Economic Studies 68, 235-60.
[17] Brock, W.A., Durlauf, S.N. (2001b). Interactions-Based Models, in J. Heckman and E.
Leamer, eds., Handbook of Econometrics 5, Elsevier Science B.V., 3297-380.
[18] Clotfelter, C.T. (1983). Tax Evation and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns.
Review of Economics and Statistics 65(3), 363-373.
[19] Cohen-Cole, E. (2004). Resolving the Identiﬁcation Problem in Linear Social interac-
tions Models: Modeling with Between-Group Spillovers. Mimeo.
[20] Collins, J.H., Plumlee, R.D. (1991). The taxpayer’s labor and reporting decision: The
effect of audit schemes. The Accounting Review 66, 559-76.
[21] Dhami, S., al-Nowaihi, A. (2006). Why Do People Pay Taxes: Expected Utility Versus
Prospect Theory, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, forthcoming.
[22] Dubin, J.A.,Graetz, M.J., Wilde, L.L. (1990). The Effect of Audit Rates on the Federal
Individual Income Tax, 1977-1986. National Tax Journal 43(4), 395-409.
[23] Elffers, H., Weigel, R.H. and Hessing, D.J. (1987). The Consequences of Different
Strategies for Measuring Tax Evasion Behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology, 8,
311-37.
[24] Erard, B., Feinstein, J.S. (1994). The Role of Moral Sentiments and Audits Perceptions
in Tax Compliance. Public Finance/Finances Publiques 49 (Supplement), 70-89.
[25] Evans, W.N., Oates, W. Schwab, R. (1992). Measuring Peer-Group Effects: Study of
Teenage Behavior. Journal of Political Economy 100(5), 966-91.
[26] Falk, A., Fischbacher, U. (2002). “Crime” in the lab-detecting social interaction. Euro-









































9[27] Falk, A., Fischbacher, U., G¨ achter, S. (2004). Living in Two Neighbourhoods – Social
Interactions in the Lab, Working Paper 150, University of Zurich.
[28] Feinstein, J.S. (1991). An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and its Detec-
tion. Rand Journal of Economics 22(1), 14-35.
[29] Friedland, N., Maital, S., Rutenberg, A. (1978). A Simulation Study of Income Tax
Evasion. Journal of Public Economics 10, 107-16.
[30] Glaeser, E.J., Scheinkman, J., Sacerdote, B.I. (2003). The Social Multiplier. Journal of
the European Economic Association 1 (2), 345-53.
[31] Gordon, J.P.F. (1989). Individual Morality and Reputation Costs as Deterrents to Tax
Evasion, European Economic Review 33, 797-805.
[32] Gourieroux, C., Laffont, J.J., Monfort, A., (1980). Coherency Conditions in Simultane-
ous Linear Equation Models with Endogenous Switching Regimes, Econometrica 48(3),
675-95.
[33] Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk. Econometrica 47(2), 263-291.
[34] King, S., Sheffrin, S.M. (2002). Tax Evasion and Equity Theory: An Investigative Ap-
proach. International Tax and Public Finance 9, 505-521.
[35] Klepper,S., Nagin, D. (1989). The Anatomy of Tax Evasion. Journal of Law, Economics
and Organization 5(1), 1-24.
[36] Kooreman, P. (2006). Time, Money, Peers, and Parents; Some Data and Theories on
Teenage Behavior, Journal of Population Economics, forthcoming.
[37] Krauth, B. (2006). Simulation-based estimation of peer effects, Journal of Economet-
rics, forthcoming.
[38] Manski, C.F. (1993). Identiﬁcation of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reﬂection Prob-
lem. Review of Economic Studies 60(3), 531-42.
[39] Manski, C.F. (2000). Economic Analysis of Social Interactions. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 14(3), 115-36.
[40] Mofﬁtt, R.A. (2001). Policy interventions, Low-Level Equilibria and Social Interactions,
in S.N. Durlauf and H. Peyton Young (Eds.), Social Dynamics, Brookings Institution.
[41] Myles, G.D., Naylor, R.A. (1996). A Model of Tax Evasion with Group Conformity and









































9[42] Robben, H.S.J., Webley, P., Weigel; R.H., Warneryd, K.E., Kinsey, K.A., Hessing, D.J.,
Alvira, M.F., Elffers, H., Wahlund, R., van Langenhove, L., Long, S.B., Scholtz, J.T.
(1990). Decision Frame and Opportunity as Determinants of Tax Cheating. Journal of
Economic Psychology 11, 341-364.
[43] Sheffrin, S.M., Triest, R.K. (1992). Can Brute Deterrence Backﬁre? Perceptions and
Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance. In Slemrod, J. (ed.), Tax Compliance and Tax Law
Enforcement. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 193-218.
[44] Shelling, T. (1978). Micromotives and Macrobehavior, New York: Norton.
[45] Slemrod, J.B., Blumenthal, M., Christian, C. (2001). Taxpayer response to an increased
probability of audit: evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota. Journal of
Public Economics 79, 455-83.
[46] Spicer, M., Becker, L.A. (1980). Fiscal Inequity and Tax Evasion: An Experimental
Appoach. National Tax Journal 33(2), 171-5.
[47] Spicer, M., Hero, R.E. (1985). Tax Evasion and Heuristics: A Research Note. Journal of
Public Economics 26, 263-7.
[48] Torgler, B. (2002). Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax
Compliance in Experiments. Journal of Economic Surveys 16(15), 657-84.
[49] van Praag, B., Frijters, P., (1999). The Measurement of Welfare and Well-Being: The
Leyden Approach, in D. Kahneman, E. Diener and N. Schwartz, Well-Being: Founda-
tions of Hedonic Psychology. New-York: Russell Sage.
[50] Webley, P., Robben, H.S.J., Elffers, H., Hessing, D.J. (1991). Tax Evasion: The Experi-
mental Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[51] Wenzel, M. (2004). An Analysis of Norm Processes in Tax Compliance. Journal of Eco-
nomic Psychology 25, 213-228.
[52] Yitzhaki, S. (1974). A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis. Journal of
Public Economics 3, 201-2.
[53] Zeiliger, R. (2000). A Presentation of Regate, Internet Based Software for Experimental










































You will be taking part in an experiment on decision-making under the aegis of both Universit´ e Laval in Qu´ ebec
andUniversit´ eLumi ` ereLyon2. Theexperimentis designedsothatyourearningswilldependonyourdecisions.
The session consists of 10 rounds. The ﬁrst ﬁve rounds involvea single-period,i.e. require a single decision.
The next ﬁve rounds include several periods, with each period requiring one decision. In each round you will
receive a score based on your decisions. The average score over entire session will determine your earnings.
Scores are converted into Euros at the following rate: 100 experimental currency units = 15 e. In addition, you
will receive a show-up fee of 1.5 e. Your earnings will be paid in cash at the end of the session in a separate
room to preserve the conﬁdentiality of your earnings.
You will be part of a group of 15 participants from the same school. All your decisions are anonymous.
Talking is not allowed throughoutthe entire session. Any violation of this rule will result in being excluded from
the session and not receiving any payment. If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise
your hand; your question will be answered publicly.
ROUNDS 1 to 5
Each round consists of a single period. At the beginning of each round, each participant receives an en-
dowment of 100 experimental currency units . You are requested to give back a percentage of this endowment
according to a “rate of deduction”. There are 5 different rates and each of these is randomly assigned to 3
participants. The sum of the deductions from the group members serves to ﬁnance scientiﬁc projects.
The rate of reduction will be applied to the amount you report. You must use the scrollbar to report any
amount between 0 and 100 (100 corresponding to the endowment that you received).
This amountcan be audited accordingto a certainaudit probabilityand this audit may entail a penalty. There
are 5 different audit probabilities and each of these is randomly assigned to 3 participants. The consequences of
an audit are indicated below. There are 3 possible cases.
• If the amount you report is not audited, your deduction rate will apply to your reported amount. In this
case, no penalty applies. Your payoff is given by the following formula:
Payoff = Endowment - Deduction
Deduction = Deduction rate × Reported amount
• If the amount you report is audited and is equal to your endowment, your deduction rate applies to this
amount and consequently no penalty applies. Your payoff is given by the following formula:
Payoff = Endowment - Deduction









































9• If the amount you report is audited and is less than your endowment, your deduction rate applies to your
endowment. Inaddition,youwill be chargeda penaltyequal to yourdeductionrate times the nonreported
fraction of your endowment. Your payoff is then equivalent to:
Payoff = Endowment - Deduction - Penalty
Deduction = Deduction rate × Endowment
Penalty = Deduction rate × Endowment - Reported amount
What information do you receive at the beginning of each round?
At the beginning of each round, you are informed about the following:
•
• the 5 different deduction rates.
• your own deduction rate.
• the 5 different audit probabilities.
• your own audit probability.
On your computer screen you will ﬁnd a scrollbar ranging from 0 to 100 which you must use to indicate
the amount you wish to report. As you move the scrollbar, you will see both your payoffs if audited or not. To
validate your decision, you must stop the scrollbar on the desired amount and then click the ”OK” button. Once
all the participants have clicked the ”OK” button, the next round will begin automatically.
You will be informed about the following at the end of the session only:
•
• the actual audit of your reported amounts and the number of the rounds in which an audit actually took
place.
• the payment of a penalty when applicable.
• your payoff.
What changes from one round to the next ?
Each round is independent from the previous ones. At the beginning of each new round, you will receive a
new endowment of 100 experimental currency units. Likewise, new deduction rates and audit probabilities will
be assigned randomly to participants.










































9ROUNDS 6 to 10
The session will continue in a moment, but with two changes however.
1. From now on, each round consists of several periods.
At the beginning of each new period of a round, you will receive an endowment of 100 experimental
currency units. Everyone keeps the same deduction rate and audit probability for all the periods of a
given round. When a new round begins, new deduction rates and audit probabilities will be assigned
randomly to all participants, including you.
2. As of the second period of a round, and for each successive periods, you will be given two additional
pieces of information:
•
• how many participants among the other 14 participants have reported less than their endowment in
the preceding period.









































9Appendix B: Values of tax rates and audit probabilities
The values of the tax rates and the audit probabilities used in each session are the following:
SESSIONS 1 TO 4
Distribution of the audit probabilities
Standard
Regime Individual Probability Mean Deviation
Low 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.33 0.37 0.18 12.2
Medium 0.07 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.25 10.3
High 0.24 0.27 0.33 0.37 0.43 0.33 6.2
Distribution of the tax rates
Standard
Regime Individual tax rates Mean Deviation
Low 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.30 0.70 0.26 23.5
Medium 0.20 0.35 0.40 0.50 0.55 0.40 12
High 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.50 7
SESSIONS 5 TO 8
Distribution of the audit probabilities
Standard
Regime Individual Probability Mean Deviation
Low 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.37 0.41 0.23 13.6
Medium 0.13 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.42 0.30 9.95
High 0.28 0.30 0.37 0.40 0.47 0.36 6.89
Distribution of the tax rates
Standard
Regime Individual tax rates Mean Deviation
Low 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.35 0.75 0.31 23.54
Medium 0.25 0.40 0.45 0.55 0.60 0.45 12.25
High 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.55 7.07
SESSIONS 9 TO 12
Distribution of the audit probabilities
Standard
Regime Individual Probability Mean Deviation
Low 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.29 0.33 0.15 13.22
Medium 0.03 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.21 10.29
High 0.20 0.23 0.29 0.33 0.40 0.29 7.13
Distribution of the tax rates
Standard
Regime Individual tax rates Mean Deviation
Low 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.25 0.65 0.24 21.54
Medium 0.15 0.30 0.35 0.45 0.50 0.35 12.25











































Mean Stand. Min Max
Dev.
Amount reported in Part I 53.92 37.54 0 100
Amount reported in Part II 50.15 38.68 0 100
Age 23.61 5.94 17 50
Tax rate 0.38 0.16 0.05 0.75
Audit probability 0.25 0.11 0.02 0.47
Sex (Female=1) 0.40 0.49 0 1
Inequality aversion index 1.33 0.84 0 2
Number of observations
Groups 12
Rounds Part I + Part II 120
Rounds that converged in Part II 53
Participants per group 15
Observations on amount reported in Part I 900
Observations on amount reported in Part II∗ 795
- Censored at 0 in Part I (Part II) 164 (195)
- Censored at 100 in Part I (Part II) 189 (151)
- Not censored in Part I (Part II) 547 (449)










































Estimation Results of the Tax Compliance Model
Dependent variable: Reported Individual Income (Di/100)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Two-Limit Two-Limit Two-Limit Simultaneous
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Group: ¯ Dτ
−i Group: ¯ D
τ−1
−i Group: ¯ D
τ−1
−i Group: ¯ Dτ
−i
Para. Std. Para. Std. Para. Std. Para. Std.
Error Error Error Error
Intercept 0.692 0.529 0.039 0.461 0.344 0.202 -0.021 0.405
ti -0.969 0.782 -1.348 0.792 -1.139 0.725 -1.524 0.701
t2
i 1.311 1.017 1.797 1.026 1.505 0.923 1.955 0.907
pi 1.780 0.224 1.802 0.235 1.808 0.231 1.914 0.210
¯ t−i 1.576 2.930 2.871 2.710 1.046 0.433 1.248 2.261
¯ t2
−i -0.393 3.683 -2.321 3.404 -0.747 2.836
¯ p−i 2.479 0.683 0.420 0.834 0.447 0.700 -0.304 0.524
g1 0.455 0.134 0.199 0.139 0.202 0.138 0.117 0.116
g2 0.099 0.120 0.010 0.124 0.015 0.122 0.012 0.110
g3 0.094 0.127 0.008 0.132 0.011 0.131 0.000 0.117
g4 -0.061 0.133 0.061 0.137 0.068 0.135 -0.077 0.121
g5 -0.148 0.131 -0.143 0.136 -0.143 0.135 -0.112 0.122
g6 -0.636 0.140 -0.397 0.151 -0.397 0.144 -0.285 0.123
g7 -0.413 0.134 -0.272 0.142 -0.273 0.138 -0.222 0.122
g8 -0.014 0.150 -0.091 0.155 -0.097 0.154 -0.033 0.138
g9 0.634 0.126 0.343 0.130 0.344 0.129 0.231 0.104
g10 0.283 0.120 0.190 0.124 0.186 0.123 0.086 0.110
g11 0.487 0.115 0.322 0.117 0.322 0.117 0.144 0.102
¯ D−i -2.966 0.407 -0.813 0.468 -0.817 0.414 -0.046 0.046
σ 0.630 0.024 0.651 0.024 0.651 0.024 0.588 0.022
Log-Lik -745.556 -770.544 -770.809 -727.665











































(5) (6) (7) (8)
Simultaneous Simultaneous Two-Limit Two-Limit
Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit (NOINFO)
Group: ¯ Dτ
−i Group: ¯ Dτ
−i Group: Nil Group: Nil
Para. Std. Para. Std. Para. Std. Para. Std.
Error Error Error Error
Intercept 0.076 0.185 -0.092 0.341 -0.164 5.368 -0.204 1.213
ti -1.457 0.627 -1.529 0.643 -1.306 0.723 1.294 0.560
t2
i 1.861 0.806 1.899 0.821 1.666 0.921 -1.578 0.709
pi 1.915 0.212 1.913 0.207 1.835 0.230 1.597 0.173
¯ t−i 0.661 0.403 0.727 0.385 1.005 0.429 -0.193 0.319
¯ p−i -0.297 0.660 -0.300 0.530 -0.324 0.577 0.165 0.452
g1 0.118 0.128 0.117 0.116 0.088 0.298 0.222 0.111
g2 0.014 0.103 0.041 0.108 0.001 0.121 0.121 0.097
g3 0.001 0.116 -0.007 0.116 -0.021 0.551 0.220 0.159
g4 -0.075 0.119 -0.100 0.149 0.007 1.616 0.092 0.377
g5 -0.112 0.118 -0.058 0.122 -0.113 0.136 0.059 0.109
g6 -0.285 0.130 -0.212 0.123 -0.228 0.567 0.182 0.178
g7 -0.222 0.122 -0.197 0.141 -0.250 1.083 0.060 0.258
g8 -0.035 0.129 -0.007 0.138 -0.091 0.556 0.155 0.172
g9 0.231 0.109 0.226 0.103 0.240 0.290 0.165 0.112
g10 0.085 0.103 0.117 0.120 0.214 1.078 0.421 0.266
g11 0.145 0.104 0.109 0.102 0.232 0.292 0.329 0.110
Sexi(1=female) 0.147 0.049 0.105 0.056 0.098 0.042
Aversi 0.082 0.030 0.088 0.270 0.046 0.065
Avers−i -0.013 0.188 0.144 3.756 0.144 0.865
¯ D−i -0.046 0.389 -0.045 0.046
σ 0.588 0.023 0.578 0.022 0.648 0.024 0.531 0.023
Log-Lik -727.698 -717.043 -766.723 -676.465
Obs. 795 795 795 900
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